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Bank Not Liable for Requiring a Corporate Client To
Commit an Ultra Vires Act - TBCA 2.04A By-Passed
Acting under broad authorization' from the board of directors to
deal with Republic National Bank of Dallas and specific authoriza-
tion to negotiate a loan for $257,500,' the president and secretary of
Tex-Mex corporation obtained a loan in that amount. The bank re-
quired, as a term of the loan, that the corporation pay the balance of
the corporate president's present indebtedness' to the bank with a
portion of the proceeds. Accordingly, the president executed a new
note, payable to the corporation, which became a part of the collateral
given to the bank to secure the loan.' Two months later, the presi-
dent informed the board of directors that the corporation had paid his
indebtedness as a part of the loan agreement.! The corporation made
nine payments on the note until the directors and stockholders au-
thorized the bank to sell their note to a third party.! With the dispo-
sition of the proceeds of the sale, the agreement between the bank
and the corporation became completely executed.! Two months later,
'Record, pp. 58-60, Whitten v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 397 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1965).
The resolution, which had been filed with the bank, authorized the president and secretary
to borrow money from the bank or to deposit and withdraw company funds from the bank,
though the withdrawal item was payable to one of them in cash or for credit to their per-
sonal account, and freed the bank from any responsibility of inquiry with respect to any
such withdrawals.
'Record, p. 48, Whitten v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 397 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1965). The
resolution authorized negotiations for $257,500, with authority to pledge $680,000 in com-
mercial paper held by the corporation as collateral.
31d. at pp. 46-49. On November 24, 1959, the corporation owed the bank $329,187.50;
its wholly owned subsidiary owed the bank $97,500; and the president owed the bank
$65,270.83 on his personal note of $75,000.
'The corporation agreed to give the following security for the new advance by the
bank: (a) the president's note payable to the corporation in the amount of $65,270.83, se-
cured by a pledge of 37,500 shares of the corporation's stock; (b) two second-lien notes
for $600,000 and $80,000 respectively, together with a subordination of its remaining lien
rights to the holder of the notes.
'Republic Nat'l Bank v. Whitten, 383 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), aff'd,
397 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1965).
6 Ibid.
7For a price of $370,000, the purchaser took delivery of the corporation's notes
($257,500, on which was owed $219,981.41 plus accrued interest, and another unrelated
note on which the corporation owed $5,999.92 plus accrued interest) which totaled
$226,655.65, including interest and the collateral securing them. The purchaser paid the
rest of the consideration, $143,344.35, to the corporation. The $600,000 second-lien note
was endorsed to the purchaser by the corporation, and the debt owed the bank was ex-
tinguished.
'Republic Nat'l Bank v. Whitten, 383 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), aff'd,
397 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1965).
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a petition of bankruptcy was filed against the corporation, on which
it was adjudicated bankrupt. Whitten, the trustee in bankruptcy,
sued the bank to recover damages suffered by the use of corporate
funds to discharge the indebtedness of one of the officers. No fraud
was alleged. The court of civil appeals, in reversing the trial court's
judgment for the trustee, held that the trustee had failed to state a
cause of action for the following reasons: the transaction was ultra
vires and thus was within the scope of claims abrogated by the Texas
Business Corporation Act;' the corporation had received sufficient
benefits from the executed contract to estop it as a matter of law to
assert ultra vires as the basis of its claim; and the corporation had rati-
fied the transaction. ° The Texas Supreme Court granted writ of
error. Held, affirmed: When a corporation receives direct and sub-
stantial benefits from a fully executed contract, it is estopped as a
matter of law to assert ultra vires as a basis for a claim for payments
made under the contract. Whitten v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 397 S.W.
2d 415 (Tex. 1965).
I. ULTRA VnrEs IN TEXAS
In the early Texas case of Bond v. Terrell Cotton & Woolen Mfg.
Co." the Texas Supreme Court defined ultra vires acts as those be-
yond the powers conferred on a corporation by its charter and the
statutes under which it was incorporated. The court distinguished
ultra vires acts from illegal acts (i.e., those inherently evil, specifically
prohibited by statute, or against public policy)," a distinction gen-
erally adhered to by the majority of United States jurisdictions.
The issue of ultra vires, or lack of capacity, was available to a corpo-
ration as a basis for rescission of a contract or as a defense to prevent
the enforcement of a contract." The purpose was to protect share-
holders of a corporation from loss when corporate management ex-
ceeded its authority to make contracts in the corporation's name."
O The Texas Business Corporation Act is hereinafter referred to as the TBCA.
"Republic Nat'l Bank v. Whitten, 383 S.W.2d 207, 214 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), aff'd,
397 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1965).
" 82 Tex. 309, 18 S.W. 691 (1891).
'2 Ibid.
"' Ibid.
14 See, e.g., Wagg v. Toler, 80 Cal. App. 501, 251 P. 973 (Dist. Ct. App. 1926); Mitchell
v. Hart, 107 Ind. App. 548, 25 N.E.2d 665 (App. Ct. 1940); Bath Gaslight Co. v. Claffy,
151 N.Y. 24, 45 N.E. 390 (Dist. Ct. App. 1896); 7 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
3400 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1964).
"Thompson, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in Relation to Private Corporations, 28 AM.
L. REV. 376 (1894).
"6 See 7 FLETCHER, Op. cit. supra note 14, §§ 3406-14, 3432, 3437, 3473; 1 HILDEERAND,
TEXAS CORPORATIONS 339-86 (1942).
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However, the plea was soon abused and was used as a tool to place
the burdens of corporate mismanagement on third parties dealing
with the corporation in good faith." To mitigate the abuse, the bars
of estoppel and ratification were allowed. In Bond, and later cases,
Texas courts have held that a corporation is estopped to plead ultra
vires when it has received direct and substantial benefits" under the
agreement (whether executed," or executory"0 ). Moreover, it is
generally accepted that a corporation may ratify an ultra vires trans-
action,2 although there is substantial conflict as to the manner by
which ratification may be effected. 2
Due to the differences of opinion among courts as to the nature
of ultra vires acts, there has been confusion in this area of the law."
Legislatures often have sought to clear away the confusion by enact-
ing statutes abrogating ultra vires as a plea against third parties."'
At the same time, shareholders have been given statutory protection
against the directors and officers participating in or approving ultra
vires transactions."' In 1956 the Texas legislature attempted to abro-
gate the plea of ultra vires as a basis of a claim or defense involving
17 Ibid.
5" These direct and substantial benefits are the benefits of the performance of the other
party to the contract. Bond v. Terrell Cotton & Woolen Mfg. Co., 82 Tex. 309, 18 S.W.
691 (1891) (proceeds of a loan); Texas W. Ry. v. Gentry, 69 Tex. 625, 8 S.W. 98 (1888)
(conveyance of real property). Money or property benefits are generally sufficient to create
an estoppel. See I HILDEBRAND, op. cit. supra note 16, § 137 (1942).
19 Bond v. Terrell Cotton & Woolen Mfg. Co., 82 Tex. 309, 18 S.W. 691 (1891) (pro-
ceeds of a loan); Malone v. Republic Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 70 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1934) error dism. (collateral on corporate president's note); J. M. Guffey Petroleum
Co. v. Jeff Chaison Townsite Co., 107 S.W. 609 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) (oil under royalty
contract); Parker v. Citizens' Ry., 95 S.W. 39 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) error ref. (purchase
price of real property); 1 HILDEBRAND, op. cit. supra note 16, § 135.
'Kincheloe Irrigation Co. v. Hahn Bros., 105 Tex. 231, 146 S.W. 1187 (1912) (rent
for farm land); Tenison v. Patton, 95 Tex. 284, 67 S.W. 92 (1902) (sale price of real
estate); Bond v. Terrell Cotton & Woolen Mfg. Co., 82 Tex. 309, 18 S.W. 691 (1891)
(proceeds of a loan); Texas W. Ry. v. Gentry, 69 Tex. 625, 8 S.W. 98 (1888) (conveyance
of real property); Williford Lumber v. Malakoff Buick Co., 113 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1938) error dism. (liens and notes on real property); Malone v. Republic Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 70 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error dism. (collateral on corporate
president's loan); Reed v. Continental State Bank, 2 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928)
(deposits by surety as security on a note); see cases cited in 1 HILDEBRAND, OP. cit. supra
note 16, § 137.
"'Kirby v. Fitzgerald, 89 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Comm. App. 1936); Fort Worth Nat'l
Bank v. Harwood, 229 S.W. 487 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921) (the unauthorized use of cor-
porate funds to pay a personal debt); Hall v. Crawford & Delphenis Co., 11 S.W.2d 804
(Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error dism.
"aCompare Republic Nat'l Bank v. Whitten, 383 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)
with Liebowitz, Director Misconduct and Shareholder Ratification in Texas, 6 BAYLOR L.
REV. 1 (1953). See also Note, 43 TExAs L. REV. 796 (1965).
23 See authorities supra note 16.
'" See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 803(b) (1947); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, 5 157.8 (1957);
MD. CODE ANN. art. 23, 5 124 (1951); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 5 2852-303 (1950);
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-5 (1950); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.06 (1951). See also text infra
note. 27.
21 See authorities cited note 16 supra and note 34 infra.
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contracts with parties outside the corporation." Article 2.04A of the
Texas Business Corporations Act, passed in that year, provides: "Lack
of capacity shall never be made the basis of any claim or defense at
law or in equity.""7
II. LOANS TO OFFICERS
Following Bond, the legislature provided the statutory definition of
ultra vires in Texas with article 1349 of the Texas Revised Civil
Statutes " (passed before the TBCA and still in force). However, this
statute merely prohibits a corporation from using its assets beyond
its corporate purpose or for purposes otherwise permitted by law.2"
Since Bond, the Texas courts have held that article 1349 is a general
prohibition and does not render illegal an act which is otherwise
merely ultra vires. "° Thus, before the enactment of article 2.02A(6)
of the TBCA, loans to officers out of corporate funds, which were
held to fall only within the scope of article 1349,31 were unquestion-
ably legal. "
Article 2.02A(6) of the TBCA, in defining corporate powers,
provides: "Subject to the provisions of Sections B and C of this
Article, each corporation shall have power... (6) To lend money to,
and otherwise assist its employees, but not to its officers and direc-
tors." The TBCA also provides for a derivative action on the part
of the stockholders against directors who approve a loan by the cor-
poration to one of its officers.' These provisions of the TBCA are
very similar to the comparable provisions of the Model Business Cor-
"Bar Committee Comments, art. 2.04, 3A VERNoN's ANN. Crv. STAT. 40; Brimble,
Ultra Vires Under the Texas Business Corporation Act, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 677 (1961).
'
7 TEXAS BUs. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.04A (1965). The comparable provision of the
Model Act is § 6.
28TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1349 (1925) prohibits corporations from using their
means or assets "directly or indirectly for any purpose whatever other than to accomplish
the legitimate business of its creation, or those purposes otherwise permitted by law."
29Lange Soap Co. v. Ward, 269 S.W. 851 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
'4Staack v. Routledge, 111 Tex. 489, 241 S.W. 944 (1922); Lange Soap Co. v. Ward,
269 S.W. 851 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
"1Malone v. Republic Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 70 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934)
error dism.
"Whitten v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 397 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. 1965); Paddock v.
Siemoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 218 S.W.2d 428 (1949); Milam v. Cooper Co., 258 S.W.2d 953
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.
"TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02A(6) (1956).
14 TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.41A(4) (1956) provides: "In addition to any
other liabilities imposed upon the directors of a corporation: . . . (4) The directors of a
corporation who vote for or assent to the making of a loan to an officer or director of the
corporation . . . shall be jointly and severally liable to the corporation for the amount of
such loans until the repayment thereof."
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poration Act." However, the model act contains an additional pro-
vision (section 42) which expressly prohibits loans by a corporation
to its officers or directors.' This section was not incorporated into the
TBCA. The significance of the omission of the prohibitive section and
the proper construction of article 2.02A (6) of the TBCA are shown
by Whitten."7
III. WHITTEN V. REPUBLIC NAT'L BANK
In Whitten, the Texas Supreme Court construed the latter portion
of article 2.02A (6) of the TBCA as being "a limitation on a specific
power granted, not a positive prohibition." ' At first glance, the
wording of the statute, "but not to officers and directors," seems
prohibitive." But, the title of article 2.02 is "General Powers," and,
thus, article 2.02A (6) is a grant of powers with a limitation on the
extent of the grant. As a result, an act which exceeds the limitations
on article 2.02 powers is ultra vires but not illegal. Further, the omis-
sion of section 42 of the model act4" from the TBCA indicates an in-
tention not to render loans to officers illegal but rather to conform
this portion of the TBCA to the pre-TBCA case law which held loans
to officers to be ultra vires."
In Whitten, the court stated that, although the issues of statutory
abrogation of the plea of ultra vires by the TBCA and ratification
might be "of academic interest . . . resolution of [these] issues was
unnecessary and would serve no useful purpose, ' "a because the bene-
fits which the corporation had received under the contract consti-
tuted sufficient direct and substantial benefits to estop the corporation
as a matter of law to assert ultra vires as the basis of its claim for re-
covery.' This holding is in accord with Texas law" and with the
" Compare article 2.02A(6) TBCA with ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT S 4(f)
(1959). Compare article 2.41 (4) TBCA with ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 43(d)
(1959).
36ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT § 42 (1959) provides: "No loans shall be made
by a corporation to its officers or directors." The comment to § 4(f) states: "Loans to
officers are expressly prohibited (§ 42) and directors who vote for or assent to such a loan
are personally liable to the corporation for the amount of the loan until the repayment
thereof (§ 43 (d))."
"
7 Whitten v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 397 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1965).
3 61d. at 419.
39 See note 33 supra.
4 See note 36 supra.
41 See notes 28-32 supra.
witten v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 397 S.W.2d 415, 415-16 (Tex. 1965).
4 The direct and substantial benefits received were: (1) $73,800 with which the cor-
poration refinanced the claims of other creditors and (2) $20,474.17 in free funds. 397
S.W.2d at 417.
44See notes 19-20 supra.
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holdings of the majority of United States jurisdictions." Generally,
the only benefit necessary to operate an estoppel is the fruit, profit,
or advantage of the other party's performance." If no benefits are
received by the party pleading ultra vires, clearly no estoppel will be
raised."' However, no concise guidelines as to what are direct and sub-
stantial benefits have been set forth by the courts, nor did the court
attempt to do so in Whitten. Apparently, each case will be examined
on an ad hoc basis to determine whether the benefits received by
either party are sufficient to estop him from pleading ultra vires.
IV. THE UNANSWERED ISSUES
The court's decision not to deal with the questions of statutory ab-
rogation and ratification leaves unresolved two important issues which
were clearly before the court. A third issue, whether the officers and
directors breached their fiduciary duty to the corporation and, if so,
the consequences to the defendant bank as a result of its participation
in the transaction, apparently was not presented to the court. The
court specifically noted that no fraud was alleged."8 Had fraud been
alleged, the rights of the parties would have been materially altered."
A. Article 2.04 Of The TBCA
Abrogation of the plea of ultra vires by article 2.04A"° fulfills one
of the primary purposes of the TBCA; it removes some of the bur-
dens of responsibility previously imposed on third parties dealing
with corporations and imposes the greatest portion of these burdens on
4 Field v. Bittner, 267 Ill. App. 346, aff'd, 354 Ill. 215, 188 N.E. 342 (1933) (purchase
price of notes); Dome Realty Co. v. Gould, 285 Mass. 294, 189 N.E. 66 (1934) (com-
promise saving time and expense of litigation); Day v. Spiral Springs Buggy Co., 57 Mich.
146, 23 N.W. 628 (1885) (delivery of purchased goods); Hobart-Lee Tie Co. v. Grodsky,
339 Mo. 706, 46 S.W.2d 859 (1931) (purchased goods); 7 FLETCHER, Op. cit. supra note
14, §§ 3473, 3478-79.
47 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 14, § 3473.47 W. W. Britton Inc. v. S. M. Hill Co., 327 Mass. 335, 98 N.E.2d 637 (1951) (labor
and materials); Jemison v. Citizens' Savings Bank, 122 N.Y. 135, 25 N.E. 264 (Ct. App.
1890) (purchase not delivered; no conveyance of title); Dunagan v. Bushey, 152 Tex.
630, 263 S.W.2d 1948 (1953) (unpaid stock subscriptions); Twisp Mining & Smelting Co.
v. Cholan Mining Co., 16 Wash. 2d 264, 133 P.2d 300 (1943); American Express Co. v.
Citizens' State Bank, 181 Wis. 172, 194 N.W. 427 (1923) (guarantee of an acceptance);
7 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 14, § 3478.
"sWhitten v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 397 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. 1965).
" A corporation may recover on an ultra vires contract where there is fraud or collusion
between the officer or board of directors and the party dealing with the corporation. How-
ever, even if fraud was alleged, in a case similar to the principal case, there could be no
double recovery. Thus, the corporation could not recover from the officer or board of direc-
tors and the third party. McCombs v. Abrams, 28 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930),
aff'd, 48 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932); Southwestern Cooperage Co. v. Kivlen, 266
S.W. 826 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
" See authorities cited note 26 supra.
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the corporation itself." With the necessity for ultra vires as a plea
removed,"' the court's failure to discuss article 2.04 (the focal point
of counsels' briefs and argument) leaves the force and scope of this
important provision clouded in mystery."
Article 2.04 seems too explicit to justify judicial interpretation. At
the time the TBCA was enacted, there were statutes in force in other
jurisdictions which provided for exceptions to abrogation in situa-
tions where the third party dealing with the corporation had knowl-
edge that the transaction was ultra vires."' However, these exceptions
were not incorporated into article 2.04 of the TBCA, with the re-
sult that the statutory abrogation as to outside third parties dealing
with the corporation is complete."s Seemingly, the court is reluctant
to endorse complete abrogation. In cases where the third party (here
the bank) has instigated the ultra vires transaction, the court seems
to require elements of estoppel for that party to be protected from
the plea of ultra vires. Perhaps the court will look at each case indi-
vidually to determine if direct and substantial benefits were received.
B. Ratification And Breach Of Fiduciary Duty
The actions of the corporation with regard to the contract raised
the issue of ratification. There is substantial conflict as to the manner
in which an ultra vires transaction may be ratified. The court of civil
" See Brimble, supra note 26; 7 FLETCHER, Op. cit. sukra note 14, §§ 3406-14; 1 HILDE-
BRAND, op. cit. supra note 16, at 339-86.
" See text and authorities supra notes 23-26.
13 A recent Fifth Circuit case notes that the defense of ultra vires has been abrogated in
Texas law. Spool Stockyards Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 353 F.2d 263 (5th
Cir. 1965). For a holding similar in reasoning to the principal case, see Rio Refrigeration
Co. v. Thermal Supply, 368 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).4 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.11 (1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.12 (1965). A descrip-
tion of the various types of statutes dealing with ultra vires is found in 2 HORNSTEIN,
CORPORATION LAW 5 563 (1959).
"See authorities cited supra note 47. Trustee contended that knowledge would cause
article 2.04B to apply by negative implication. Article 2.04B abolishes the doctrine of in-
herent incapacity and provides that ultra vires may be asserted in three specific situations:
(1) shareholder suits against the corporations to enjoin the performance of executory ultra
vires contracts, (2) proceedings by the corporation or derivatively by the shareholders
against incumbent or former officers or directors for exceeding their authority, and (3) pro-
ceedings by the attorney general to dissolve the corporation, enjoin performance of an execu-
tory contract, or to enforce divestment of real property acquired in ultra vires transactions.
It is clear that article 2.04B does not make any provision as to outside parties dealing with
the corporation and does not provide that knowledge will prevent the application of article
2.04A. If knowledge that a transaction was ultra vires could prevent the application of
article 2.04A, the statute would be meaningless and could seldom be applied. Under the doc-
trine of constructive notice of statutes, there would be few, if any, situations in which a
third party dealing with a corporation would not have knowledge, since, for example, almost
every ultra vires act is a violation of article 1349. Hence, the burden of ultra vires would
again fall on those dealing with corporations, not on the corporation where it belongs, and
the purpose of article 2.04A would be completely frustrated.
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appeals' discussion of the issue " prompted substantial comment;57
yet the Texas Supreme Court's decision that the issue of ratification
was "academic""6 leaves the court of civil appeals' opinion as the au-
thoritative resolution of the conflict.
When the question is raised as to whether the officer's conduct was
a breach of fiduciary duty, resolution by the court of the issue of
ratification becomes more important."s In Texas, it is settled law that
the directors and officers of a corporation occupy a fiduciary relation-
ship to the shareholders and act in the capacity of trustees for them.0
Consequently, an officer or director may not secure a private advan-
tage at the expense of the corporation."1 In Whitten, the only benefit
that the president received was substitution of creditors; yet the
transaction, while technically not a breach of trust," was clearly a
breach of fiduciary duty in that it deprived the corporation of the
use of the funds required to pay the president's note."a Without a de-
cision as to the question of ratification, the court is, in effect, con-
doning a breach of fiduciary duty and the defendant bank's participa-
tion in this breach.
V. CONCLUSION
Whitten is significant for the issues it leaves unresolved. To be
sure, existence of benefits" seems to justify the application of the
estoppel doctrine, and a resolution of the other issues would have no
further effect on the outcome of the instant case. However, there are
ultra vires transactions in which estoppel could not operate. 5 In elect-
ing not to discuss the issues of statutory abrogation and ratification
" Republic Nat'l Bank v. Whitten, 383 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).5 7 Compare Republic Nat'l Bank v. Whitten, 383 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)
with Liebowitz, Director Misconduct and Shareholder Ratification in Texas, 6 BAYLOR L.
REV. 1 (1953). See also Note, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 796 (1965).
s See note 42 supra.
HA corporation may ratify a breach of fiduciary duty in the same manner as an ultra
vires transaction. Hence, a finding of ratification would negate the breach. Hall v. Craw-
ford & Delphenis, 11 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) error dism.; State Nat'l Bank v.
Davidson, 295 S.W. 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error dism.; 2 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra
note 14, § 751.
" Trinity-Universal Ins. Co. v. Maxwell, 101 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error
dism.; 3 FLETCHER, Op. cit. supra note 14, § 838. They are not trustees in the strictest sense,
but, as fiduciaries entrusted with the management of the corporation for the benefit of the
shareholders, the relation is one of trust. Paddock v. Siemoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 218 S.W.2d
428 (1949); Henger v. Sale, 357 S.W.2d 774, modified, 365 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. 1963).
e See authorities cited note 59 supra.
"
2 Paddock v. Siemoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 218 S.W.2d 428 (1949).
3 Ibid. An officer is required to use his official powers for the benefit of the corporation
in utmost good faith. 3 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 14, § 850.
"See note 43 supra.
65 As for example, an ultra vires transaction which results in a loss to the corporation or
those in which the other party has not performed. See authorities cited note 47 supra.
[Vol. 20
